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Temporal, definitional, and spatial errors may be present in maps, as 
well as errors of underreporting and estimation. These are illustrated in 
a series showing the diffusion of AIDS in the United States, and consti-
tute an example of science as a socially negotiated and hermeneutic 
enterprise. 
A !though terminating in 1990, the five maps illustrating this article s till constitute the most detailed graphic expression ever presented 
of the geographic diffusion of the AIDS epidemic in the continental 
United States.1 Based on approximately 2,500 spatially varying units, 
most of them counties, they have raised questions about the neglect of the 
spatia l perspective by public health authorities during 
the first decade of the epidemic, 2 and they have 
shocked an American audience in such f ublic forums 
as Time, Forbes, and Playboy magazines. They are also 
available in animated form for educational television 
directed at young people, who now form the cohort of 
the population most at risk.4 It is worth emphasizing 
immediately that the contour-color interval is geomet-
ric, each change up the natural spectrum from blue to 
red multiplies by 7.5 the previous value, with the red 
areas simply "over 2000." However, if you made a 
three-dimensional map in 1995, and used 0.25 millime-
ters to represent each person dead or dying from AIDS 
in the five boroughs of New York City, you wou ld have 
a spike fifteen meters high, and only slightly smaller 
ones at Los Angeles, San Francisco, Miami, etc. 
Taken as a whole, the sequence constitutes a power-
ful rhetorical statement, using the word "rhetorical" in 
its old and honorable sense as the "art of persuasion."5 
Upon reviewing the "AIDS explosion" in the carto-geographic domain, 
many people are persuaded for the first time that AIDS is not something 
"out there," remote and far removed from them, but may well be all 
around them. To a geographer, the sequence is a classic case of spatial 
diffusion, with strong evidence of both hierarchical diffusion, controlled 
by relations of interaction in the urban system or hierarchy,6 and spatially 
contagious diffusion from regional epicenters-the "wine stain on the 
tablecloth" effect. 
•Respectfully dedicated to the memory of Brian Harley, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. 
This article is a very slightly revised and updated version of "Sources d'erreur dans une serie 
de cartes, ou: la demarche scientifique, objet de negociations," MappeMonde, 2, 1993, pp. 22-
27. 
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The carto-geographic perspective challenges the totally aspatial view of traditional epidemiological modeling 
confined exclusively to the time domain.7 Since the construction of such a series illuminates aspects previously 
hidden by bureaucratic obtuseness parading in apparently impeccable ethical concern for confidentiality, and 
since actually seeing the explosive diffusion in the first decade may be politically delicate, especially in an election 
year in the United States,8 we may expect attempts to throw doubt on the series, attempts emphasizing that errors 
are present. It is important to deal with such efforts to denigrate in a direct, firm, scientific and philosophically 
aware manner. 
In any scientific statement, there is error since science is a mortal, rather than a divine, enterprise. However, 
after examining a large literature, it becomes apparent that little has been added to any theory of error since Karl 
Friedrich Gauss made maps for the Duke of Hanover during the eighteenth century. Those who boldly pro-
nounced judgment about the amount of error always retreat behind a cloud of assumptions after realizing that 
one cannot specify any quantity or degree of error without actually knowing the truth. Even such a correspon-
dence theory of truth (and, therefore, of error) has been in disarray since the days of Kant, and no one living in 
these hermeneutic days could take such an approach seriously. What we can do is make some quite open judg-
ments about the types and sources of error, and then argue that these would not alter any major conclusions 
about the geographic processes at work and the carto-geographic representations these produce. Whether a 
reader finds such scientific rhetoric persuasive or not depends on the hermeneutic or interpretative stance he or 
she is prepared to take. In the end, scientific truth is always socially negotiated, including the construction and 
interpretation of maps, as Brian Harley was able to teach us before his tragically early death in 1991.9 
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The fourth kind of error is 
spatial error-a form lying in a 
domain of thinking familiar to 
the geographer, but an intellec-
tual arena where doctors of 
medicine and epidemiologists 
have little if any experience. 
What are the sources and types of error that take this research from the 
error-free realm of the immortal gods to the foothills of Mount Olympus 
where ordinary geographers live? There are essentially five, none of 
which can be cleanly separated except for purposes of exposition. First, 
there is the problem of underreporting, particularly in the early years of 
the epidemic. Less was known about the various ways an infected person 
could convert to symptoms diagnostic of AIDS; tests were less reliable; 
and some doctors (perhaps up to SO percent during the early years in 
Germany) were prepared to sign death certificates for "pneumonia," 
"cancer," and so on to spare the feelings of shame that some families 
expressed. Early maps are likely to reflect such errors of omission rather 
than commission. 
Second, there are temporal errors-usually delays in reporting that 
make it extremely difficult to monitor the course of the epidemic properly, 
and so use forecasting techniques which rely on recent information to 
make appropriate parametric adjustments. No matter how sophisticated 
the methodology and technology used, it is no use monitoring junk.10 We 
may even find ourselves in the curious situation that model predictions, 
far from over-estimating the course of the epidemic, actually turn out in 
the future to be closer to some unknown truth than the official figures 
reported by medical bureaucrats. This constitutes a nice philosophical, 
not to say political, problem in its own right. 11 Even when AlOS is a 
legally reportable disease, errors of temporal specification may be gross: 
in June 1991, for example, 75 percent of the AlDS cases reported in Wash-
ington, DC were not days, weeks, or even months late but had been 
diagnosed in previous years. 12 
Errors over time are clearly related to the third type of errors-defini-
tional errors. After the first decade-and-a-half of the pandemic, as more 
has been learned about the HIV virus and its effects on the human im-
mune system, we are able to recognize, in lowered T4 cell counts and 
other diagnostic approaches, the earlier signs of conversion to opportunis-
tic diseases. New definitions in 1993 interrupted the previous time series, 
inflating cumulative totals to the point today (1995) where the 400,000 
mark has long been exceeded and the totals are still growing. In the 
previous year (1992), scientific advances in diagnostic tests were found to 
be politically unacceptable, and so were socially negotiated away by 
centralized power structures. For one more year, a nation breathed a sigh 
of relief that things were not so bad after all. How many more people are 
infected today we do not know with any reasonable degree of assurance. 
The fourth kind of error is spatial error-a form lying in a domain of 
thinking familiar to the geographer, but an intellectual arena where 
doctors of medicine and epidemiologists have little if any experience. 
Unfortunately, such ignorance does not prevent them from making 
judgments-some of them catastrophic for our deeper understanding of the 
epidemic and for our ability to intervene with education and health care 
planning. Spatial error is simply misplacing in space values reported, and 
it may be thought of as the geographical equivalent of delayed reporting 
in the temporal domain (i.e., "misplacing" people by a month or a year). 
Like any other error, it is unavoidable to some degree. Even if we had a 
dot map of each person, 13 the individual dots would only stand as a 
spatial mean for a probabilistic smear or "field of movement" created by 
individual human lives. 
Spatial error is particularly likely to arise in connection with the fifth 
kind of error-errors of estimation. Many of these arise because of the 
quite proper and understandable ethical concern to protect the identity of 
people with AIDS. I wish to make it quite clear that I am in total agree-
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ment with this ethical ideal, while noting at the same time that it has been 
carried to quite absurd extremes. 14 Spatial errors of estimation arise when 
we want to move to finer levels of spatial resolution with data (numbers 
of people with AIDS) that have been deliberately aggregated spatially, 
ostensibly to preserve confidentiality. Notice, however, that even the 
ability to observe scientifically now becomes socially negotiated, with the 
negotiations directed and informed by the ethos of a society and the 
power it is willing to allocate to certain groups of professional "experts". 
In the United States, most states now report regularly by county: some, 
like Virginia, by zip or postal code; others, such as, Kentucky by aggrega-
tions of counties into regions; one (Nebraska) by three, totally irrelevant 
economic areas; another (South Dakota) by two regions east and west of 
the Missouri River, although this physical feature is not known to be an 
effective barri.er to the diffusion of HIV; while a few states (Wyoming, 
Wisconsin) still report only state totals. Generally, there is a tendency to 
report by smaller and smaller_ spatial units as the epidemic, measured by 
rates of infection, intensifies. b 
I want to illustrate the problem of spatial errors of estimation and the 
way these problems are produced and convoluted by a melange of other 
problems by focusing upon three states in the map sequence-namely 
Texas, Florida and Iowa. Texas is prepared today to report by county, and 
from 1986 onwards, the map sequence uses the officially reported, up-
dated, and corrected figures. But, before 1985, there was no consistent 
database, and even today, the state medical authorities only know the 
cumulative county totals from 1985 onwards. As a result, we have to 
estimate the 1982 'and 1984 values in this part of the country. This actually 
requires no sophisticated mathematics or computational model: the 
annual totals for 1985-1990 plot with classical smoothness and regularity, 
and they can be extrapolated back with a plastic curve to be anchored at 
1981, when what we now call AIDS was first recognized (although not the 
HIV, which was only "discovered" in early 1983). Thus, we can estimate, 
with what must be only the very slightest error, the cumulative totals for 
1982 and 1984. 
The question then is: how do we assign these totals spatially? Since we 
have the map distributions (i.e., the spatial series) for 1985 onwards, we 
can simply deflate county values, say for 1984, by the ratio of the cumula-
tive totals 1984I1985. This is a simple linear extrapolation backwards, but 
the difference between the linear and nonlinear approximation will be 
minute over this time span. Some informed and educated guesswork is 
involved: a county may appear on the map in the lowest category (blue) 
with one or two people with AIDS a year before or after it really did, but 
recall that we have no idea what the reality was in those days and no 
better way of capturing it. The reader of this text and map must simply 
judge whether this is plausible, whether it is reasonable, whether it is 
persuasive. And note: this judgment will be informed by what the reader 
brings to these written and graphical texts; in other words, it will be 
related to the hermeneutical stance one is prepared to adopt. I suggest 
that an experienced geographer will find such spatial estimations accept-
able. I further suggest that the ordinary lay person, viewing Texas in the 
entire sequence, will accept the 1982 and 1984 maps without comment 
since they reflect what I can only call a "spatial logic" that is to be found 
everywhere else on the map (California, Washington, New York, New 
England, etc.). Each map seems to develop quite 'logically' out of the 
previous one, like a photographic plate developing in the darkroom. On 
the other hand, bureaucratic epidemiologists, trained to think exclusively 
in the temporal domain, and slowly realizing that they may have been 
Spatial errors of estimation 
arise when we want to move to 
finer levels of spatial resolution 
with data (numbers of people 
with AIDS) that have been 
deliberately aggregated spa-
tially, ostensibly to preserve 
confidentiality. 
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Iowa presents another problem, 
one shared by states like Mon-
tana and South Dakota. These 
states are characterized by rural 
populations of very low density, 
interspersed by a few urban 
centers. Only state totals are 
available for states Like these. 
sitting on scientifically valuable spatial series without knowing what to do 
with them, may try to exaggerate the minute errors injected by such a 
procedure. Science becomes, once again, a socially negotiated endeavor. 
Florida presents other human, not to say politically charged, problems. 
Many polite inquiries to the Florida State Health Authorities for cumula-
tive county values produced replies to the effect that they were quite 
capable of handling the geographical analysis of the epidemic themselves, 
that only state totals were available to outsiders, and that they needed no 
help whatsoever-thank you very much! Fortunately, one state health 
worker, who clearly must remain anonymous, thought this attitude was 
unreasonable, defensive, and even unethical since, in a state where the 
epidemic was rapidly becoming catastrophic, it made a major database the 
private preserve of a few researchers who had no appropriate geographi-
cal and methodological ways of using the data. At that time, no geo-
graphic modeling had been undertaken, let alone published. We received 
a xeroxed packet of county values as they had appeared at the end of each 
year, and we inflated these by a factor based on corrected state totals after 
the database had been revised by incorporating late reports. In construct-
ing the Florida sequence from these revised figures, we were also fortu-
nate in having perhaps the only geographical analysis of the diffusion of 
HIV at the time, an analysis whkh used Florida as one of four case 
studies.16 The result is the only published sequence of AIDS diffusion, a 
sequence with very small, though still unspecifiable, errors. 
Iowa presents another problem, one shared by states like Montana and 
South Dakota. These states are characterized by rural populations of very 
low density, interspersed by a few urban centers. Only state totals are 
available for states like these. Even states, such as Wisconsin, which has a 
higher population density and a reasonably developed central place 
structure focusing upon Milwaukee-Chicago, exhibit this problem. In 
cases like these, the cumulative state totals must be assigned in proportion 
to the county populations. Such an estimation procedure is based on the 
perfectly reasonable assumption that AIDS is, in large part, density 
dependent.17 Detailed analyses of somewhat similar states, like Ohio and 
Pennsylvania, 18 confirm this procedure as reasonable in the absence of any 
other information. In actual fact, other information for Montana, Wyo-
ming, and North and South Dakota was made available to me under the 
standard and strict ethical conditions governing the scientific reviewing 
procedure. It is clear that in the early stages of the AIDS epidemic-the so-
called "seeding" stages-the appearance of AIDS cases in areas of ex-
tremely low rural population densities consisted almost entirely of young 
homosexual men coming home to die from major urban epicenters on the 
east and west coasts. I cannot and will not use such information to 
"correct" the earliest maps, so here spatial error must be knowingly left 
literally in place. 
In the early years, the cumulative numbers for these sparsely settled 
states are very small, counted in tens or less, and in later years, as the 
epidemic takes hold, the maps become more and more reliable (i.e., less 
prone to error). In a year when Montana had ten cases, the national total 
was already in the tens of thousands. The overall relative error is minute: 
the local spatial error may be initially quite large but reduces quickly. 
Notice it is not the totals in a state that are in dispute (except for the other 
sources of error discussed above) but the exactitude of the spatial alloca-
tions. With the exception of Waldo Tobler's "error ellipses" in the very 
different area of multidimensional scaling and cartography, I do not think 
we know much about measuring such errors. And, once again, how can 
you measure error without knowing beforehand what the truth is? 
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Turning back to the five map sequence, what effects might such errors 
have on our belief that the sequence is a reasonably accurate representa-
tion of the diffusion of the AIDS epidemic at this scale? I emphasize "at 
this scale" since we reco~ze degrees of generalization in any carto-
graphic representation.1 No one would attempt to use these maps for 
analytical purposes appropriate to much finer levels of resolution. The 
thickness of a contour line may well exceed the size of some of the town-
ships reporting in a state like Virginia. Some degree of generalization is 
inevitable in any scientific statement. Indeed, and perhaps almost by 
definition, a scientific statement in words, graphics or algebras is a gener-
alization where we can see the forest rather than the individual trees. 
Notice that in regions where the county database is reasonably fine, and 
the official values reported considered reasonably reliable (over much of 
the eastern part of the country, for example), the unfolding sequence 
generates a high degree of trust and therefore belief. The "spatial logic" 
appears reasonable and truthful mainly because the information content 
in such "spatial logic" arises precisely out of the plausible spatial 
autocorrelative properties in such relatively "local" areas. But why 
should we believe that Iowa, Texas and Florida, and other states where 
estimations have been made, are any different? Yet, notice further how 
words like " trust," "belief," "reason," and "truth" have entered the 
discussion. Whether you trust the map sequence, whether you believe it 
to be reasonable and close to some unknown truth, depends upon you 
and what you bring to the hermeneutic task, a task that faces us as human 
beings as a condition of possibility. Thus, and as thoughtful scientists, it is 
necessary to negotiate in a communicative discourse. 
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